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It is with sorrow that we inform you of the passing of University of Illinois, School
of Labor and Employment Relations Professor Emeritus, Peter Feuille. Professor
Feuille was a Faculty Editor of the Illinois Public Employee Relations Report for many
years. We are grateful to his colleague, Professor Robert A. Bruno for the following
Memoriam tribute.

IN MEMORIAM - PETER FEUILLE
Robert A. Bruno Professor & Director, Labor Education Program, University of Illinois School of
Labor & Employment Relations
Professor Feuille joined the then-Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations in 1977, providing over 30
years of service to the school and campus. He taught Workplace Dispute Resolution and Collective
Bargaining to students in the School and from the College of Law. From 1994-2006, he served as the
School’s Director. He received his PhD from University of California, Berkeley, in 1973 and his Bachelor
of Arts from Claremont McKenna College in 1967.
Beyond guiding and protecting the school through some tumultuous budgetary and structural times on
campus, he spearheaded the evolution of the school Master’s degree from its historical focus on industrial
relations to the current face of modern human resources. As part of this, the degree name changed to the
Master of Human Resources and Industrial Relations, and the tutorial was replaced with coursework
reflecting the growing knowledge about human resources. The school’s Labor Education Program also
added faculty and grew into one of the largest, multi-dimensional union studies programs in the country.
Without his work, the school would not enjoy the success that it does today.
Peter was also a guiding light and diligent laborer in many professional organizations, including the
National Academy of Arbitrators and especially the Labor and Employment Relations Association
(LERA). He served as the Secretary-Treasurer of LERA for 14 years, from 2000-2014.
He was well-known for his arbitration work, research and publications, and expertise on collective
bargaining. Professor Feuille was a major contributor to the first rigorous research on public employee
collective bargaining as it was developing. He helped to form what was called the “collective bargaining
group” in the 1990s, which brought together scholars interested in advancing the frontiers of theory.
His list of distinguished contributions to the labor and employment relations field is lengthy. He has
received two of the highest honors in our field, both the Susan C. Eaton Scholar-Practitioner Award
(2006) for distinction as both a researcher and a practitioner in the field, and the Lifetime Achievement
Award (2014) for lifelong contributions to the field of Industrial Relations and Human Resources.
Peter personified the best values of those who worked in the labor and employment relations field. He
combined research on the key issues of the time, with his roles as teacher, mentor, and academic leader,
and directly engaged in shaping practice and policy. He will be remembered for all these reasons.
Peter is survived by his wife, Susan, and his children, Julie King and Taylor Feuille.
For those who are interested making a gift to honor Professor Feuille, please visit the link below to the
LER Scholars Fund that awards the Peter Feuille Scholarship.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
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Jim Connolly, Ning Ding, Naomi B. Frisch, and Jenna Kim
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POLICE BODY CAMERAS: DO ILLINOIS PUBLIC
EMPLOYERS HAVE A DUTY TO BARGAIN OVER
THEIR USE?
By, James Powers
JAMES POWERS is a founding partner at the law firm of Clark Baird Smith LLP, where he concentrates
his practice in labor and employment law, with an emphasis in public sector labor law. His labor
relations experience includes representing employers in proceedings before the National Labor
Relations Board, Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board and Illinois Labor Relations Board. He also
represents employers in grievance and interest arbitration proceedings, and regularly serves as chief
negotiator for employers in collective bargaining negotiations. Jim received his B.A. from
Northwestern University and J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law, where he was elected to the Order
of the Coif, and graduated as valedictorian.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Ferguson, Missouri. Cleveland, Ohio. Baltimore, Maryland. Chicago,
Illinois. These cities unfortunately have become synonymous with allegations of
police brutality, where citizens have died in altercations with sworn police
personnel. These incidents have focused the national consciousness on race
relations between police and citizens (especially those who belong to protected
categories). Rightly or wrongly, the reality is that a large segment of the United
States population does not trust police officers to enforce laws impartially for all
citizens.
Not surprisingly, calls have come from special interest groups, the media and
politicians for greater surveillance of police interactions with the general
public. Such monitoring, however, is complicated by the fact that many police
officers perform their job duties “in the field” beyond traditional worksites.
To many, the apparent solution involves the use of officer-worn camera devices
(i.e., “body cams”). Politicians like Hillary Clinton have called for their use in all
police departments.[1] The federal government has offered tens of millions of
dollars to cities for the purchase and implementation of body cameras.[2] This
effort appears to be working. Whereas more that 75 percent of police departments
responding to a government-funded survey in July 2013 reported that they do not
use body cams,[3] the Associated Press now reports that major cities such as
Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, Los Angeles and Houston have gradually
introduced body cams to segments of their police forces.[4]
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The adoption of such technological innovations may trigger collective bargaining
obligations under state and local labor laws. As seen in the private sector, new
surveillance techniques sometimes can constitute mandatory subjects of
bargaining.[5] Contrary to popular belief, however, not all surveillance techniques
and technology can or should invoke a decisional bargaining obligation. Unlike
the private sector, a public employer’s motivation for implementing surveillance
technology often has more to do with citizen safety and community relations
concerns as opposed to identifying workplace misconduct that can hurt a
company’s “bottom line.” As such, the amenability of bargaining over the decision
to implement public sector surveillance technology may be greatly reduced, if not
totally eliminated.
Such collective bargaining questions are not purely an academic concern. When
one considers that the national public sector union density rate was 45 percent for
local government employees in 2015, and 38.5 percent for employees in protective
service occupations,[6] the odds are good that a collective bargaining question may
arise during a police department’s implementation of new surveillance technology.
This article provides a brief survey of how labor law treats the negotiability of
workplace surveillance devices. Part II addresses Illinois’ newly-enacted Law
Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act,[7] and describe the types of issues
that the Act addresses (and, perhaps more importantly, what the Act does not
address). Part III reviews the historical private sector labor law treatment of
workplace surveillance devices. In the process, commentary will be provided on
the inherent limitations that such administrative precedent has for public sector
employers, where motivations for implementing workplace surveillance
technology often differ from private sector companies. Part IV summarizes public
sector labor law treatment of the negotiability of workplace surveillance
technology. Parts Y and VI address alternative defenses and bases for bargaining
over issues relating to workplace surveillance technology. Part VII attempts to
synthesize the various decisions into a comprehensive model for analyzing the
negotiability of public sector workplace surveillance technology, including body
cams.
II.

THE ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER-WORN
BODY CAMERA ACT

On August 12, 2015, Governor Rauner signed into law Public Act 99-0352, which
is more commonly referenced as the “Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body
Camera Act.” Besides establishing the Act itself, Public Act 99-0352 amended a
variety of other related statutes, including for example, the Freedom of
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Information Act (exempting disclosure of body cam recordings),[8] Use Tax and
Service Occupation Tax Acts (requiring the deposit of $500,000 into the State
Crime Laboratory Fund),[9] the Police Training Act (creating a professional
conduct database that requires reporting police officers discharges for certain
offenses),[10] the Law Enforcement Camera Grant Fund (expanding the use of
grant money for the use of officer-worn body cams),[11] and the Illinois Criminal
Code (prohibiting the use of “choke holds” by peace officers).[12]
Most of the Act’s provisions took effect on January 1, 2016. Contrary to popular
belief, however, the Act does not mandate the use of body cam technology by
Illinois police departments. If a public employer voluntarily chooses to use such
technology, however, its program must comply with the Act’s provisions.[13] In
this respect, the Act sets forth a series of stated purposes and advantages of using
body cam technology:
 “Officer-worn body cameras will provide state-of-the-art evidence collection and
additional opportunities for training and instruction.”[14]
 “[O]fficer-worn body cameras may provide impartial evidence and documentation to
settle disputes and allegations of officer misconduct.”[15]
 “Ultimately, the uses of officer-worn cameras will help collect evidence while improving
transparency and accountability, and strengthening public trust.”[16]

Based on these legislative findings, the General Assembly determined that it was
necessary to create “standardized protocols and procedures for the use of officerworn body cameras to ensure that this technology is used in furtherance of these
goals while protecting individual privacy and providing consistency in its use
across this State.”[17]
Accordingly, the Act delegates to the Illinois Law Enforcement Training Standards
Board the task of developing “basic guidelines for the use of officer-worn body
cameras by law enforcement agencies.”[18] These guidelines (which have yet to be
established) “shall be the basis for the written policy which must be adopted by
each law enforcement agency which employs the use of officer-worn body
cameras.”[19] These departmental written policies must include, among other
things, the following:
 “Cameras must be equipped with pre-event recording, capable of recording at least the
30 seconds prior to camera activation, unless the officer-worn body camera was
purchased and acquired by the law enforcement agency prior to July 1, 2015.”[20]
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 “Cameras must be capable of recording for a period of 10 hours or more, unless the
officer-worn body camera was purchased and acquired by the law enforcement agency
prior to July 1, 2015.”[21]
 “Cameras must be turned on at all times when the officer is in uniform and is responding
to calls for service or engaged in any law enforcement-related encounter or activity, which
occurs while the officer is on duty. . . . [subject to a number of exceptions].”[22]
 “The officer must provide notice of recording to any person if the person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and proof of notice must be evident in the recording. If
exigent circumstances exist which prevent the officer from providing notice, notice must
be provided as soon as practicable.”[23]
 “Recordings made on officer-worn cameras must be retained . . . on a recording medium
for 90 days.”[24]
 “Following the 90-day retention period, . . . all recordings must be destroyed, unless
any encounter captured on the recording has been flagged.” An encounter is deemed to
be flagged when:
(i) a formal or informal complaint has been filed;
(ii) the officer discharged his/her firearm or used force during the encounter;
(iii) death or great bodily harm occurred to any person in the recording;
(iv) the encounter resulted in a detention or an arrest, excluding minor traffic
offenses or business offense;
(v) the officer is the subject to an internal or otherwise being investigated for possible
misconduct;

(vi) the supervisor of the officer, prosecutor, defendant, or a court determines that
the encounter has evidentiary value in a criminal prosecution;
(vii) the recording officer requests that the recording be flagged for official
purposes related to his or her official duties.”[25]

Recordings may also be retained for training purposes.[26]
The Act specified that “[r]ecordings shall not be used to discipline law enforcement
officers unless:
(A) a formal or informal complaint of misconduct has been made;
(B) a use of force incident has occurred;
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(C) the encounter on the recording could result in a formal investigation under the
Uniform Peace Officers’ Disciplinary Act; or
(D) as corroboration of other evidence of misconduct.”[27]

Departments must insure proper care and maintenance of officer-worn body
cameras. Relatedly, officers must as soon as practical document and notify the
appropriate supervisor of the technical difficulties, failures, or problems with the
officer-worn body camera or associated equipment. Upon providing such notice,
“the appropriate supervisor shall make every reasonable effort to correct and
repair . . . the officer-worn body camera equipment.”[28]
The Act further provides:
No officer may hinder or prohibit any person, not a law enforcement officer, from
recording a law enforcement officer in the performance of his or her duties in a public
place or when the officer has no reasonable expectation of privacy. [T]he . . .
[Department’s] written policy shall indicate the potential criminal penalties, as well as
any departmental discipline, which may result from unlawful confiscation or destruction
of the recording medium of a person who is not a law enforcement officer.[29]

The Act allows the recording officer and his or her supervisor to access and review
recordings prior to completing incident reports or other documentation, provided
that the officer or his or her supervisor discloses that fact in the report or
documentation.[30]
As the above summary demonstrates, there are a host of operational questions that
the Act does not address. Aside from the fact that the Training Standards Board
has not yet developed the Act’s implementing regulations, local police departments
are left with the numerous questions. For example, a recently-filed federal lawsuit
against a Chicago suburban police department alleges violations of federal and
state constitutional privacy principles resulting from activating body cam footage
in bathrooms and locker rooms.[31] The suit raises the question of when and how
a Department may activate body cams beyond the minimum time frames required
by the Act. Additional questions that police departments face include:


What limits, if any, are there on a supervisor’s discretion to maintain body cam
footage beyond 90 days due to the footage having “evidentiary value?”



What limits, if any, are there on a supervisor’s ability to peruse body cam footage
at random without a formal complaint relating to the incident and/or independent
information indicating that the officer may have engaged in misconduct?



Should officers subject to an internal non-criminal investigation be allowed to
review body cam footage before being subjected to departmental questioning?
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What, if any, discipline should result from an officer’s mishandling of body cam
footage and equipment?

The Act also raises the question of what, if any, discipline should result from an
officer’s improper confiscation of a video or audio footage by a private citizen who
is recording the officer’s performance of his official duties?
While some of these questions arguably might fall within the scope of so-called
“impact and effects” bargaining, the primary question still remains: does a
Department have to bargain with a union in the first instance over the decision to
implement officer-worn body cameras? As will be explained below, private sector
precedent does not provide a perfect answer due to the inherent differences
between public and private employer motivations.
III.

PRIVATE SECTOR NEGOTIABILITY DETERMINATIONS
REGARDING SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY

In the private sector, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) consistently
has held that the installation and use of hidden surveillance cameras is
mandatorily negotiable. In one of its seminal decisions involving surveillance
cameras, the NLRB held in Colgate-Palmolive Co. [32]that the employer had a
statutory obligation to collectively bargain over: (1) the circumstances under
which hidden surveillance cameras would be activated; (2) the general areas in
which they would be placed; and (3) the cameras’ use in the event they recorded
improper employee conduct. The NLRB theorized that the video surveillance
in Colgate-Palmolive was “germane to the working environment,” allegedly no
different than physical examinations, drug/alcohol testing requirements, and
polygraph testing.[33] The NLRB also concluded that monitoring an employer’s
workforce to ferret out misconduct does not implicate the employer’s
“entrepreneurial control:”
The installation of and use of surveillance cameras in the workplace are not among that
class of managerial decisions that lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. The use of
surveillance cameras is not entrepreneurial in character, is not fundamental to the basic
direction of the enterprise, and impinges directly on employment security. It is a change
in the Respondent’s methods used to reduce workplace theft or detect other suspected
employee misconduct with serious implications for its employees’ job security, which in
no way touches on the discretionary “core of entrepreneurial control.”[34]

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted this approach
in National Steel Corp. v. NLRB,[35] where it concluded that the installation of
workplace surveillance cameras was a mandatory subject of bargaining. The court
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reasoned that the cameras focused on the “working environment” as a way to
uncover employee misconduct.[36]
The NLRB’s reliance on the “entrepreneurial control” standard highlights the
inherent difference between private and public sector employers. In most cases,
“for-profit” companies use workplace surveillance as a way to deter employee
misconduct or protect their work product and premises from theft and
damage. Such decisions usually do not implicate the company’s long-range
entrepreneurial direction, such as what products to make, how to price those
products, and how to expand its customer base.
By contrast, a public entity often uses surveillance technology to provide for the
safety and welfare of its citizens, which arguably goes to the “core” of the public
employer’s “entrepreneurial control.” In essence, citizen safety is the business of
most public employers. By the same token, unions presumably have little (if
anything) to offer at the bargaining table to offset the public employer’s safety
concerns. As the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested, the lack of power or authority
to offer some type of constructive concession is what often renders a bargaining
issue a permissive as opposed to a mandatory subject of bargaining.[37]
Applying these principles to the public sector context, unions would be hard
pressed to claim that an employer must bargain over the decision to install
surveillance coverage in the following contexts:


Installing surveillance cameras on the Illinois tollway system to identify vehicular
accidents and expedite safety vehicles, even though they might capture unionrepresented tollway workers engaging in misconduct while driving along the
highway;



Installing surveillance cameras in and around the public areas of municipal
buildings to deter criminals from targeting citizens and employees, even though
they might also capture union-represented workers engaging in misconduct in or
around the public building.

In these scenarios, unions presumably would have little to offer an employer across
the bargaining table that would address the underlying motivation for implanting
surveillance technology in the first instance.
How do these legal principles apply to police-worn body cams? Labor
organizations presumably will argue that body cams are intended to do nothing
more than identify officer misconduct, which allegedly does not implicate the core
of a public employer’s entrepreneurial control. As the General Assembly made
clear, however, the primary “purpose” behind the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn
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Body Camera Act is to strengthen public trust, while improving evidence collection
in the furtherance of criminal law enforcement.[38]
Once one accepts the notion that body cams are primarily intended to further the
State’s important interest in improving citizen trust in its civil servants, it becomes
easy to conclude that unions have little authority or control over the goals behind
body cams. Adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach, a labor board naturally
would question what the union can offer across the bargaining table to convince
the employer that body cams should not be implemented. In this respect, wage
and benefit concessions presumably would have little effect on the employer’s
primary interest in improving citizen confidence in its law enforcement
representatives. Moreover, union proposals for alternative ways to improve citizen
morale and confidence (e.g., community outreach programs) hardly resemble what
labor boards traditionally deem to be mandatorily negotiable conditions of
employment. In the end, when one balances a union’s bargaining interests with
the impact that bargaining would have on the employer’s inherent managerial right
to provide for citizen safety, welfare and service levels,[39] a compelling argument
can be made that the decision to install body cams is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining.
In short, private sector labor board precedent is not helpful when analyzing the
negotiability of body cam and other workplace surveillance technology in the
public sector. Due to the inherent differences between public entities and “for
profit” private sector employers, public employers and labor organizations should
look to public sector labor board precedent when making such negotiability
determinations. As will be explained below, a number of public sector labor boards
have acknowledged that, depending on the employer’s underlying motivation,
workplace video surveillance constitutes a non-mandatory subject of bargaining.
IV.

PUBLIC SECTOR NEGOTIABILITY DETERMINATIONS
REGARDING SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY

The Local Panel of the Illinois Labor Relations Board (“ILRB”) recently addressed
the negotiability of workplace video surveillance. In City of Chicago,[40] the
Chicago Public Library sought to catch an intruder after a series of break-ins. The
Library did so by installing a series of hidden video cameras without first informing
the union. One of the video cameras was directed at an employee-only break
area. Relying on NLRB precedent, the ILRB concluded that the decision to install
such across-the-board surveillance equipment was a mandatory subject of
bargaining, because it affected the terms and conditions of bargaining unit
employees. In this respect, the City apparently did not self-limit the video footage
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to catching outside intruders; rather, the footage recorded employees after hours
when patrons were not allowed in the library. Indeed, the Library relied on the
video footage at one point to discipline a bargaining unit employee for intentionally
damaging a copy machine.
Based on these facts, the ILRB apparently was persuaded that the installation of
video surveillance cameras went beyond the Library’s inherent entrepreneurial
authority. A slightly different fact pattern, however, arguably would have resulted
in a different outcome. Take for example, reports of a patron sexually abusing
minors in the library book stacks. Union counsel could not with a straight face
claim that protecting the safety of patrons (especially children) is not part of a
library’s entrepreneurial concern. In turn, if the Library limited video surveillance
to public locations that are frequented by children, the employer likely would not
incur a “decisional” bargaining obligation, even if bargaining unit members are
occasionally caught on tape engaging in misconduct in public areas.
A decision by the Washington Public Employment Relations Commission
(“PERC”) further highlights the importance of an employer’s motivation for
workplace surveillance. In King County,[41] the original intent behind video
surveillance cameras was changed from ensuring citizen security to enforcing
employee compliance with work rules. This emphasis on employee discipline led
the Washington PERC to conclude that the employer had an obligation to bargain
over the installation of new cameras (and the change in purpose for older cameras).
The emphasis on an employer’s primary motivation in the surveillance arena has
been adopted by several state labor boards. For example, in City of
Patterson,[42] the New Jersey PERC addressed a police department’s installation
of overt video surveillance cameras in a police department building. It was
undisputed that the video cameras were not installed with the goal of observing or
disciplining employees. Rather, the video surveillance was part of a larger system
installed in public areas of a police department building to enforce the safety and
security of the general public. It just so happened that bargaining unit members
occasionally were caught on the video footage. Based on these facts, the New
Jersey PERC concluded that the public employer did not have to bargain over the
decision to install overt video cameras in public areas in the first instance. An
administrative law judge with the New York Public Employment Relations Board
reached a similar conclusion in connection with the installation of GPS systems in
public works and police vehicles.[43]
Some labor boards have held that public employers need not bargain over
workplace surveillance even when the goal of the surveillance involves the
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identification of workplace misconduct. This is especially true where the
surveillance is part of a discrete and limited investigation into misconduct
occurring in non-work areas.
For example, in University of
Michigan,[44] the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (“MERC”)
ruled that an employer did not have to bargain over the installation of a
hidden camera to catch employees sleeping in an unauthorized and
unassigned “nesting” area. As the MERC explained: “Here, Respondent
installed a single camera for the limited and temporary purpose of
discovering two specific things: the identity of persons frequenting a room
that had been surreptitiously constructed without Respondent’s knowledge
or consent; and the nature of the activities occurring in that room.”[45] With
this limited purpose in mind, the MERC concluded that “the Employer’s use
of a hidden camera in an area that is not part of the working environment is
within management’s right to supervise its employees during work
time.”[46] The Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations reached a similar
conclusion in the context of the discrete use of a single camera as part of a
limited investigation into the improper copying of materials from a
supervisory police commander’s desk.[47]
The above analysis reflects the general trend among state public sector labor
boards to exempt from negotiation those surveillance decisions that are primarily
motivated by broader citizen and societal interests or are very limited in their focus
to a discrete workplace investigation. This is perfectly consistent with the NLRB’s
approach when dealing with “for profit” companies, which admittedly do not have
the same obligations toward society at large.
V.

DOES NEW TECHNOLOGY REALLY “CHANGE” ANYTHING
SO AS TO TRIGGER A BARGAINING OBLIGATION?

Even if a public employer’s adoption of a new type of surveillance technology does
not implicate an inherent managerial right to foster the service needs, safety or
welfare of its citizens, NLRB guidance suggests that new technology may not
trigger a bargaining obligation where it simply provides a more efficient and
effective type of workplace monitoring. For example, in BP Exploration of
Alaska, Inc.,[48] the employer had an established set of driver safety rules for its
Alaska “North Slope” operations, ranging from seat belt requirements to speed
limitations under certain weather conditions. The employer decided to implement
vehicle data recorders (without bargaining with the union), to help it monitor

14

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT SUMMER 2016

compliance with these safety rules, as a supplement to physical observations
conducted by two security officers. The data recorders tracked vehicle location
through GPS, and collected and transmitted data about how a vehicle was being
operated. The Union filed bad faith bargaining charges against the employer.
After an investigation, the NLRB’s General Counsel recommended that a
complaint issue, based on the theory that the installation of the data recorders was
a mandatory subject of bargaining. In doing so, the General Counsel analogized to
other investigative techniques that are mandatorily negotiable, such as the use of
video cameras, polygraphs, and drug/alcohol testing requirements. At the same
time, however, the General Counsel explained that even if a new investigative
technique was a mandatory subject of bargaining, an employer might still have no
bargaining obligation if it simply substituted one equivalent technological tool for
another.
One such example involves substituting undercover video surveillance for personal
observations during workers compensation fraud investigations.[49] By contrast,
the data recorders in BP Exploration constituted a much greater change, due to
the limited ability of the two security officers to observe safety violations across 20
oil fields and 700 motor vehicles scattered throughout Alaska’s “North Slope.”
The NLRB General Counsel had a recent opportunity to apply this principle
in Shore Point Distribution Co.[50] There, the employer had installed a GPS
tracking device in the truck of an employee suspected of “stealing time.” The
NLRB’s General Counsel recommended the dismissal of the bad faith bargaining
charge, because the company had not substantially changed its past practice
(which the union had never opposed) of assigning a private investigator to “tail”
drivers. The GPS device was simply a mechanical way of obtaining the same data
that the private investigator could obtain by physically observing
drivers. Significantly, the GPS device apparently did not “increase greatly the
chance of the Employee being disciplined.”
In light of this guidance, bargaining obligations in the employee surveillance
context should arise only where the underlying surveillance technology truly
constitutes a substantial change from the employer’s past surveillance
practices. While this principle may not apply to body cam technology, other types
of surveillance changes certainly may qualify.
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POTENTIAL EFFECTS BARGAINING OBLIGATIONS
INVOLVING BODY CAMS

Even if the underlying decision to install surveillance technology is
considered a non-negotiable inherent managerial right, the effects of such a
decision might still be negotiable. The ILRB has recognized an employer’s
obligation to bargain over the effects of a decision, even if the decision itself
might be considered to be a “permissive” subject of bargaining.[51] The
California Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) applied this
principle in the video surveillance context. In Rio Hondo Community
College District,[52] the PERB found that the employer had bargained in bad
faith by refusing to negotiate over the effects of a decision to install video
cameras in a newly constructed learning resource center. The PERB
concluded that video surveillance of bargaining unit employees reasonably
would have a future impact on those employees’ performance evaluations
and discipline. As a result, the employer was obligated to bargain over the
effects of its decision prior to the installation of the video cameras, even
though it did not have to bargain over the decision itself.
A recent decision by the Permanent Umpire under the Montgomery County,
Maryland[53] Police Labor Relations Law sheds light on the types of “effects” over
which a police union may demand to bargain in connection with body
cams.[54] The County and the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) disagreed over
the negotiability of a number of bargaining proposals related to the County’s
planned implementation of body cams for County police officers. Significantly, the
FOP did not propose that the County refrain from implementing body cams in the
first instance. Instead, the FOP proposed various limitations on the use of body
cam data. The Permanent Umpire ruled that many of these proposals were not
mandatory subjects of bargaining, due to their undue restriction on the employer’s
inherent management rights under the Police Labor Relations Law. For example:
 Volunteers for Wearing Body Cams: The FOP proposed that the
County first solicit volunteers for wearing body cams, and then compel
remaining officers in inverse order of seniority. This proposal was deemed
to be a permissive subject of bargaining, because it would unduly restrict the
County from deploying body cams where they were deemed to be most
critically
needed.[55]
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 Recording of Privileged Communications: The FOP also proposed
that an officer be allowed to deactivate body cams during privileged
conversations with spouses, attorneys, labor representatives, ministers and
the like. The Permanent Umpire also rejected this proposal as a permissive
subject, because the proposal would allow an officer to terminate a recording
even when the officer might be in the middle of a law enforcement task that
demands continued surveillance. The Umpire suggested, however, that a
more narrowly tailored proposal that addresses the inadvertent recording of
privileged communications might pass muster.[56]

 Employer Access to Recordings for Disciplinary/Investigation
Purposes: The Umpire acknowledged that the union’s proposal that would
limit the county from “routinely searching through recordings for the express
purpose of discovering one or more acts of misconduct” was a mandatory
subject of bargaining.[57] By contrast, the Umpire held that the FOP’s
proposal that would limit the county’s ability to use recording data for
disciplinary purposes if discovered during the normal and accepted course
of reviewing data recordings was a non-mandatory subject of
bargaining. According to the Umpire, such limitations would
“inappropriately impair the Department’s mission and its rights to maintain
and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of operations [and] to supervise
and direct employees.”[58]


Use for Recordings for Training Purposes: The FOP also proposed
that the County refrain from using body cam recordings for training
purposes, unless each employee involved in the recording gave written
consent, which could be withdrawn at any time and for any reason. The
Umpire ruled that this proposal that “vests the individual [officer]. . . with
the ability to stymie the Department’s ability to use the recording for training
purposes inappropriately impairs the Department’s rights and obligations
regarding
officer
training.”[59]

 Prohibition on Using Body Cam Recordings for Performance
Evaluations: The Umpire also ruled that the FOP’s proposed ban on using
body cam recording for performance evaluation purposes was a permissive
subject of bargaining. According to the Umpire, such a complete across-theboard ban on using body cam data would inappropriately impair the
Department’s right to maintain and improve the effectiveness of
operations.[60]
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This ruling of course addresses only a sample of the types of effects bargaining
proposals that a union may wish to raise in response to the use of body cams. As
explained above, the newly enacted Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body
Camera Act leaves many questions unanswered, some of which might be ripe for
effects bargaining. Time will tell whether some of these effects proposal constitute
mandatory or permissive subjects of bargaining.
Of course, effects bargaining can be waived for the term of a contract like any other
bargaining right. Such waivers usually are found in entire agreement provisions
(sometimes called “zipper clauses”) where a labor organization may have promised
to waive its right to bargain over the effects of the employer’s exercise of its
inherent rights outlined in a management rights clause. Alternatively, the ILRB
has acknowledged that parties may have “pre-bargained” over the effects of a
managerial decision, such that no further bargaining during the term of a contract
is warranted.[61] Parties obviously should consult their collective bargaining
agreements to determine their mid-term bargaining rights before embarking on
effects negotiations.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As the above discussion demonstrates, the negotiability of public sector
surveillance technology largely depends on the unique facts of each case. Several
broad principles, however, can be gleaned from these decisions:


The intent behind the installation of surveillance technology is definitely
relevant. For example, broad-based surveillance efforts as a way to ferret out
employee misconduct are more likely to be deemed mandatory subjects of
bargaining, whereas surveillance technology intended to further a public entity’s
statutory public safety role is more likely to be deemed a permissive subject of
bargaining.



The location of surveillance equipment is relevant. For example, installing
surveillance equipment in public areas and/or vehicles is more likely to be found a
non-mandatory subject of bargaining, whereas installation in non-public work
areas that capture only employee conduct is more likely to be found mandatory.



The limited use of surveillance technology for a discrete investigation into
employee misconduct in non-work areas (as opposed to a broad-based, across-theboard employee surveillance) is likely to be found a non-mandatory subject of
bargaining.



Changes in workplace surveillance that do not substantially depart from prior
surveillance practices are more likely to be deemed non-mandatory subjects of
bargaining.

18

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT SUMMER 2016


Even if the underlying decision to implement surveillance technology is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining, the effects of such a decision may well be
considered mandatory (absent a bargaining waiver in the collective bargaining
agreement).

As for the decision to implement “body cams,” the General Assembly’s stated goal
for the use of such technology certainly suggests a topic over which unions have no
authority to bargain. If one assumes that the primary goal of body cams is to
improve citizen trust in law enforcement personnel and refine evidentiary tools for
criminal prosecutions, the ILRB and its ALJs likely would conclude that the
decision to implement body cams is a permissive subject of bargaining. Such a
decision would parallel several recent ILRB rulings that have reaffirmed an
employer’s right to make unilateral staffing decisions that implicate the levels of
service and safety offered to the general public.[62]
In the end, however, bargaining over body cams may be deferred for months, if not
years, as many smaller Illinois communities presumably will wait for further
guidance form the Law Enforcement Standards Training Board before investing
the significant time and expense of creating a body cam program. In turn, this
delay may allow other jurisdictions and administrative agencies to take the lead in
exploring the aforementioned negotiability issues, such that when it finally comes
time for Illinois to enter the fray, a body of case law may already have been
developed.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By, Student Editorial Board:
Jim Connolly, Ning Ding, Naomi B. Frisch, and Jenna Kim
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the
public employee collective bargaining statutes.
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS
A. Duty to Bargain

In Board of Trustees of Community College District, #508 d/b/a City Colleges of
Chicago. v. IELRB, 2016 Ill. App. (1st) 152260-U, the First District Appellate
Court upheld the IELRB’s decision that the City Colleges of Chicago violated
Sections 14(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the IELRA by both failing to comply with the terms
of a grievance settlement and by failing to bargain the impact of a new employee
time reporting system.
The union filed a grievance in 2011 alleging that six full-time positions it sought to
include in the bargaining unit were not to be excluded under the collective
bargaining agreement’s exclusion requirements. The parties settled the grievance,
agreeing to include the positions in the bargaining unit. However, two years later,
the employer went unilaterally excluded employees holding four of those full-time
positions from the bargaining unit on the ground that they had access to
confidential information. The court affirmed the IELRB’s decision that the
employer failed to adhere to the settlement terms requiring the inclusion of the six
employees in the bargaining unit.
Additionally, the employer implemented a new time reporting system that used
bargaining unit employees’ fingerprints to record time. The union demanded
impact bargaining over the use of biometrics expressing concerns about identity
theft, safety, and privacy, among others. The employer did not respond to the
union’s demand to bargain, thus causing the union to file an unfair labor practice
charge for bad faith bargaining. The court affirmed the IELRB’s decision that the
employer failed to bargain in good faith with the union on this issue. The employer
did not challenge the merits of the IELRB’s decision, but argued that the union
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waived the issue. The court disagreed with the employer, affirming the Board’s
decision, as the union repeatedly demanded impact bargaining on the time
reporting system issue.
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS
A. Duty to Bargain

In Wheaton Firefighters Union, Local 3706 v. ILRB, ___N.E.3d___, 2016 IL App
(2d) 160105 the Second District Appellate Court held that a party does not commit
an unfair labor practice by submitting a proposal on a permissive subject of
bargaining for the first time at interest arbitration.. The IPLRA does not prohibit
an interest arbitrator from hearing permissive subjects. Further, allowing a
permissive proposal at interest arbitration does not prejudice the opposing party,
because, under section 1230.90(k) of the ILRB’s rules, if one party objects to a
permissive subject the arbitrator shall not rule on the issue. Thus, the court
concluded, the employer did not engage in bad faith bargaining by making a new
proposal on health care for the first time in interest arbitration.
The union argued that the city’s proposal, which would have allowed the city to
change health care benefits unilaterally, was a permissive subject, because it would
have required the union to waive its statutory right to midterm
bargaining. Though healthcare is generally considered a mandatory subject, the
city’s proposal was found to be permissive because it would allow the city to make
unilateral changes to the union members’ healthcare benefits during the term of
the contract. The board agreed that it was permissive, but held that the city did
not violate the IPLRA by proposing it, especially given that, pursuant to the ILRB’s
rules, the arbitrator did not resolve the issue of healthcare in his ruling. The court
found the union’s argument that the city bargained in bad faith by insisting to
impasse on a permissive subject unconvincing; instead, the court considered the
question of whether “mere submission of a new proposal for the first time in front
of an interest arbitrator can constitute an act of bargaining in bad faith.” The
ILRB’s conclusion that such a proposal on its own is not an act of bad faith was
based on clear precedent (See Village of Bensenville, 14 PERI ¶ 2042(ISLRB
1998)) and therefore not clearly erroneous. The court upheld the ILRB’s finding.
The union pointed out two instances where similar permissive proposals were
introduced at interest arbitration and the arbitrator ruled on them, suggesting that
the ILRB’s holding may lead to a situation where one party is able to force the other
to relinquish their statutory midterm bargaining rights. However, since the
arbitrator followed the rules in this case, the union had an appropriate remedy,
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and the existence of those two other cases were not enough to set aside the ILRB’s
decision.
B. Supervisors

In Chicago Joint Board, Local 200, RWDSU, United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union v. ILRB, 2016 IL App (1st) 152770-U, the First
District Appellate Court upheld the ILRB’s ruling that pharmacy supervisors in the
County of Cook Health and Hospitals System (CCHHS) are supervisors as defined
in the IPLRA, 5 ILCS 315/3(r)(1). The union petitioned to represent a unit of
pharmacy supervisors. The employer filed an objection, claiming that the
pharmacy supervisors were “supervisors” under the IPLRA and therefore
prohibited from representation by the union. The ILRB Local Panel found that the
pharmacy supervisors were statutory supervisors and dismissed the petition. The
union appealed the decision claiming that the ILRB erred in finding that the
employer had met its burden to prove that they were in fact statutory supervisors.
The ALJ found, and the Board upheld, that the pharmacy supervisors met all of the
factors under the four-part test to determine whether an employee is a statutory
supervisor. The parties stipulated to the first factor, that the supervisor’s work is
substantially different from his or her subordinates. The court upheld the ALJ’s
factual findings on the second prong of the test, that the pharmacy supervisors
have the authority to effectively recommend discipline, as not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. The court also found that it was not clearly erroneous for
the ALJ to find that the pharmacy supervisors use independent judgment in
directing their subordinates and that they spend a preponderance of their time on
supervisory functions, meeting the third and fourth prongs of the test. There was
no reason for the court to overturn the Board’s ruling on the pharmacy supervisors’
supervisory status. Generally, the ALJ found the union’s arguments not to be
credible, and the court gave deference to the Local Panel’s factual
determinations. The union’s arguments centered on the premise that the
pharmacy supervisors were mostly acting on the direction of their own superiors,
and therefore had no statutory “supervisory” duties. Ultimately the board
disagreed, and as a result the pharmacy supervisors cannot be represented by a
union.
A.

Unit Clarification Petitions

In State of Illinois, Department of Central Management Services v. AFSCME,
Council 31, Case Nos. S-UC-16-032, S-UC-16-033, S-UC-16-034 (ILRB State
Panel 2016), the ILRB reversed the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to
dismiss petitions filed by the State of Illinois, Department of Central Management
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Services seeking to exclude certain vacant positions from the bargaining unit. The
ILRB acknowledged that while the Board has historically declined to hold hearings
on vacant positions as a matter of policy, there was an abundance of evidence
provided by the employer that clearly and specifically defined the duties required
of the vacant positions.
The employer filed three unit clarifications petitions with the ILRB seeking to
exclude three vacant Public Service Administrator (PSA) positions from units
represented by AFSCME. The employer sought to exclude the positions from the
bargaining units on the ground that they were supervisory or managerial.
The ALJ dismissed the petitions because the ILRB has historically declined to hold
hearings regarding vacant titles because the hearings “necessarily result[s] in a
lack of evidence as to the actual duties of any employee who may someday hold the
disputed title.” State of Ill. Dep’t of Cent. Mgmt. Serv., 20 PERI ¶ 105 (IL LRB-SP
2004). Furthermore, the “lack of evidence makes it virtually impossible to
determine whether the position is statutorily excluded as supervisory, confidential
or managerial.” Id.
Ultimately, the ILRB reversed the ALJ’s decision and held that there was sufficient
evidence presented by the employer to determine whether the vacant positions’
anticipated duties would be sufficient to sustain exclusion from units represented
by the AFSCME. The ILRB cited authority from the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals that reliance on position descriptions was appropriate. See Moss v.
Martin, 473 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2007); Riley v. Blagojevich, 245 F.3d 357 (7th Cir.
2005). Based on the sufficient evidence presented by the employer, the ILRB
remanded the case to the ALJ for hearing.

